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ERSONAL Torts is the area of the law that addresses the crucial
need for accountability in a society where government does not
closely regulate human conduct. The liberties that our political
and economic systems afford us also create parallel responsibilities for
the effect our actions have on others. The fundamental principal behind
Tort law is that when our actions adversely affect another citizen a panel
of our peers should weigh the evidence surrounding those actions and
determine the existence and amount of any liability.
In applying these principals, a framework has developed in our judicial
system for ascribing liability. The initial point of analysis is whether the
defendant owes a duty to the aggrieved party. Does the relationship be-
tween the parties dictate that the defendant should be accountable to the
plaintiff? If duty is established, the next point of analysis is causation.
Did the actions of the defendant result in the plaintiff's injuries? If each
of these factors has been satisfied, the jury is then tasked with the respon-
sibility of assessing the plaintiff's injuries and determining the appropri-
ate amount of damages that should be applied.
In the past several years there has been a movement from the tradi-
tional common law approach to a more rigid set of codified standards.
The result is that the legislature, rather than juries, has begun imposing
guidelines for both the existence and non-existence of a duty, degrees of
causation, and limitations upon damages. The landscape has changed
dramatically in the past year due to two events. First, the legislature
passed HB 4, Article 10, which caps non-economic damages in medical
malpractice cases and was enacted in Chapter 74 of the Texas Civil Prac-
tice and Remedies Code.' The cap institutes a $250,000 non-economic
damages limit against each health care provider defendant per case and a
$250,000 cap per institution per case. There is no provision to increase
these amounts in the future due to inflation. Second, Proposition 12 was
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passed, which resulted in the addition of Section 66 to Section 1, Article
III of the Texas Constitution. Under Section 66, the legislature is specifi-
cally granted authority to limit the amount of non-economic damages
that a defendant may be liable for in health care liability claims as well as
other causes of action. Thus, the door is clearly being propped open to
expand this movement towards a codified assessment of damages. This
erosion of the right to trial by jury means that monied special interests
can avoid jurors of a plaintiff's peers and concentrate their advocacy (lob-
bying) on the only jury that counts in Texas, the legislature.
II. DUTY
Several cases during the Survey period examined the existence, or non-
existence of a legal duty.
A. THE GOOD SAMARITAN STATUTE
In McIntyre v. Ramirez,2 the defendant in the case, Dr. Douglas McIn-
tyre, moved for summary judgment based upon an affirmative defense to
ordinary negligence provided by the Good Samaritan Statute.3 Debra
Ramirez was admitted to St. David's Medical Center to have labor in-
duced. Her doctor, Dr. Patricia Gunter, visited her twice during the la-
bor, but then left the labor and delivery area. When the baby began to
crown, Dr. Gunter had not returned and the nurse sent out a page for
"Doctor Stork," which indicated to whomever was on the floor that there
was a delivery taking place without a physician and that one was needed
immediately. Dr. McIntyre was on the floor visiting his patients and re-
sponded to the page. He was neither on-call for Dr. Gunter nor had he
ever had any prior contact with Ms. Ramirez.4
Upon Dr. McIntyre's arrival, the nurse was supporting the head of the
baby and told him that Ramirez was about to deliver. The complications
of the delivery included a diagnosis of gestational diabetes, the baby was
larger than normal for its gestational age, and the baby's arm was lodged
against the mother's pelvic bone. After several failed attempts to deliver
the baby, Dr. McIntyre reached inside and "swept the infant's posterior
arm across the baby's chest and delivered the baby's arm."'5 The baby's
anterior shoulder was then delivered followed by the rest of the baby. At
this point Dr. Gunter arrived and assumed care for Ms. Ramirez. The
baby suffered injuries that resulted in permanent neurological impair-
ment and paralysis of his right upper extremity and shoulder girdle. 6
The Good Samaritan Act in relevant part reads as follows:
2. McIntyre v. Ramirez, 109 S.W.3d 741 (Tex. 2003).
3. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.001 (Vernon Supp. 2004).




(a) A person who in good faith administers emergency care ... is
not liable in civil damages for an act performed during the emer-
gency unless the act is willfully or wantonly negligent.
(b) This section does not apply to care administered:
(1) for or in expectation of remuneration; or
(2) by a person who was at the scene of the emergency because
he or a person he represents as an agent was soliciting busi-
ness or seeking to perform a service for remuneration.
c) If the scene of an emergency is in a hospital or other health care
facility or means of medical transport, a person who in good faith
administers emergency care is not liable in civil damages for an
act performed during the emergency unless the act is willfully or
wantonly negligent, provided that this subsection does not apply
to care administered:
(1) by a person who regularly administers care in a hospital
emergency room unless such a person is at the scene of the
emergency for reasons wholly unrelated to the person's work
in administering healthcare; or
(2) by an admitting or attending physician of the patient or a
treating physician associated by the admitting or attending
physician of the patient in question.
(d) For purposes of Subsections (b)(1) and (c)(1), a person who
would ordinarily receive or be entitled to receive a salary, fee, or
other remuneration for administering care under such circum-
stances to the patient in question shall be deemed to be acting
for or in expectation of remuneration even if the person waives
or elects not to charge or receive remuneration on the occasion
in question.7
At the outset, the Texas Supreme Court stated that in order to enjoy
the protection from liability provided by Section 74.001 the caregiver
must offer evidence that he did not provide care "in expectation of remu-
neration" to negate the subsection (b)(1) exception. At issue according
to Justice Wainwright was "what must a person prove to establish that he
or she did not act 'for or in expectation of remuneration"' within the
meaning of that subsection.9 In order to reach his conclusion, Justice
Wainwright went through an extensive analysis of statutory construction
that included an examination of the "plain and common meaning of the
statute's words,"1 0 tempered with the "primary objective to give effect to
the legislature's intent."11
7. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 74.001 (Vernon 2003). Note, the legislature
amended the statute effective September 1, 2003. This change removed the language at
issue in this case.
8. McIntyre, 109 S.W.3d at 742.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 745 (citing State ex rel. State Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp. v. Gonzales,
82 S.W.2d 322, 327 (Tex. 2002) (quoting Fitzgerald v. Advanced Spine Fixation Sys., Inc.,
996 S.W.2d 864, 865 (Tex. 1999))).
11. Id. (citing Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Needham, 82 S.W.3d 314, 318 (Tex. 2002) (quot-
ing Nat'l Liab. & Fire Ins. Co. v. Allen, 15 S.W.3d 525, 527 (Tex. 2000))).
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The statute is a classic example of poorly crafted legislation that at-
tempts to add protection for physicians expected to provide emergency
medical care onto an immunity originally crafted for the general public.
The result is confusing redundancy and awkward syntax. The statute was
passed in 1985 and originally read:
(a) A person who in good faith administers emergency care at the
scene of an emergency or in a hospital is not liable in civil dam-
ages for an act performed during the emergency unless the act is
willfully or wantonly negligent.
(b) This section does not apply to care administered:
(1) for or in expectation of remuneration;
(2) by a person who was at the scene of the emergency because
he or a person he represents as an agent was soliciting busi-
ness or seeking to perform a service for remuneration;
(3) by a person who regularly administers care in a hospital
emergency room; or
(4) by an admitting physician or a treating physician associated
by the admitting physician of the patient bringing a health-
care liability claim.12
The legislature then determined in 1993 that this broad exception to
liability required a provision clarifying that it would specifically apply to
individuals who normally work in a hospital emergency room, but are
providing care when they are under no obligation. The supreme court
stated that the subsection (b)(1) exception for care administered in "ex-
pectation of remuneration" applied to both subsections (a) and (c). t3 At
the same time, the legislature realized that they were creating a loophole
as it would then become standard practice for individuals who would oth-
erwise fall under the subsection to waive or not enforce a fee in order to
be protected by the statute. Thus, subsection (d) was passed in order to
"clarify" that an individual was "acting in expectation of remuneration"
under subsections (b) and (c) if they would "ordinarily receive or be enti-
tled to receive a salary, fee, or other remuneration for administering care
under such circumstances to the patient in question."1 4 The result was
confusion about whether or not a defendant had to prove he was not
"entitled" to remuneration in order to show that he did not fall under the
subsection (b)(1) exception. 15
The appeals court had denied Dr. McIntyre protection under the stat-
ute because it held "that the doctor failed to prove that he was not legally
entitled to receive payment for the emergency services he rendered. 1 6 It
was the supreme court's determination that the modifier "ordinary" in
subsection (d) applied to both the word "receive" and the phrase "enti-
12. Act of September 1, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 959, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 3242, 3299,
amended by Act of May 22, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 960, § 1, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 4193,
4194.
13. See McIntyre, 109 S.W.3d at 747-48.
14. Id. at 747.
15. Id. at 748.
16. Id. at 742.
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tied to receive" thus a doctor did not have to demonstrate that he had no
"legal" right to remuneration, but rather that he would not "ordinarily be
entitled to receive remuneration.' 7 Justice Wainright then turned to ex-
amination of the record to determine if McIntyre had established his de-
fense conclusively.' 8
The only evidence that Dr. McIntyre presented at trial was his affidavit
and his testimony at deposition, neither of which directly addressed his
entitlement to remuneration. His affidavit stated the following:
I did not charge the patient for my services nor did I render my ser-
vices in expectation of compensation. This was not a situation for
which I would ever charge. I do not specialize nor am I routinely
assigned to an emergency room. I am not on an emergency response
team and was not on call for the hospital, Dr. Gunter or her group
on the date of this incident.19
Dr. McIntyre further testified that "he was not familiar with anyone in
Travis County who would send a bill when they provided emergency care
under the circumstances of this case."'20 Noticeably absent from this evi-
dence is any mention of McIntyre's "entitlement" to compensation. Al-
though Dr. McIntyre was clearly an interested witness, Justice
Wainwright determined that the burden of proof was met because in his
opinion it met the standard for proving facts through an interested wit-
ness established in the rules of civil procedure.21
Ramirez presented evidence that related to Dr. McIntyre's practice of
receiving payment for delivering babies. The supreme court argued that
this did not address the issue of whether or not he was "entitled" to com-
pensation. The supreme court also asserted that an expert report filed by
Ramirez in which a doctor expressed the opinion that Dr. McIntyre "was
entitled to bill and receive a fee for the delivery of baby Colby Rami-
rez" 22 was a "conclusory statement of an expert witness" 23 and therefore
"insufficient to create a question of fact to defeat summary judgment. '24
While all of the evidence offered by Dr. McIntyre tended to establish
that he and his colleagues were not inclined to accept payment for his
services, especially where accepting payment would establish a legal duty,
none of it directly addressed whether or not he was entitled to it. The
only evidence offered on the issue was presented by Ramirez, but dis-
carded by Justice Wainright. The definitions provided in subsection (d)
17. Id. at 747-48.
18. McIntyre, 109 S.W.3d at 748.
19. Id. at 749.
20. Id.
21. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). "A summary judgment may be based on uncontroverted
testimonial evidence of an interested witness, or of an expert witness as to subject matter
concerning which the trier of fact must be guided solely by the opinion testimony of ex-
perts, if the evidence is clear, positive and direct, otherwise credible and free from contra-
dictions and inconsistencies, and could have been readily controverted." Id.
22. McIntyre, 109 S.W.3d at 749.
23. Id.
24. Id. (citing Ryland Group, Inc. v. Hood, 924 S.W.2d 120, 122 (Tex. 1996)).
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were added to clarify the meaning of subsection (b)(1) in the healthcare
context and to close a loophole. Under the supreme court's ruling, a de-
fendant can meet his burden of proof regarding that section without of-
fering any evidence to meet one of its clear requirements and without
allowing a jury to balance competing relevant evidence.
B. PHYSICIAN'S TREATMENT OF CHILDREN WITHOUT PARENTAL
CONSENT: EMERGENT CIRCUMSTANCES
In Miller v. HCA, Inc.,25 the Texas Supreme Court examined whether
there are circumstances that dictate an exception to the general rule that
physicians are liable for treating a child without consent. The Millers had
been awarded a judgment against HCA for negligence and battery. The
appellate court reversed the trial court as a matter of law, asserting that
"parents have no right to refuse urgently-needed life-sustaining medical
treatment for their child unless the child's condition is 'certifiably termi-
nal." 26 The supreme court affirmed the appeals court, but took a differ-
ent approach, creating an exception to the general rule that a physician is
liable for treating a child without parental consent. Describing the excep-
tion, the supreme court stated that "a physician, who is confronted with
emergent circumstances and provides life-sustaining treatment to a minor
child, is not liable for not first obtaining consent from the parents. '27
When Karla Miller was admitted into Woman's Hospital of Texas for
premature labor it was determined that her fetus was about 629 grams
and had a gestational age of approximately twenty-three weeks. To pre-
vent the baby's birth Karla was initially treated to stop labor. After phy-
sicians determined that Karla had a life threatening infection, they
decided to induce delivery. The doctors for Karla informed her husband
that upon birth the baby had little chance of being alive and if it survived
it would likely suffer from several impairments, including cerebral palsy,
brain hemorrhaging, blindness, lung disease, pulmonary infections, and
mental retardation. 28
The Millers were asked based upon this information whether they
wanted the infant treated upon birth. Their response was that "they
wanted no heroic measures performed on the infant and they wanted na-
ture to take its course. '29 That afternoon the hospital administrators met
to discuss the situation and decided that a neonatologist would be present
at the delivery and a decision would be made at birth whether or not to
attempt resuscitation. The testimony of the attendees was that this deci-
sion was made because there was some question as to how far along the
baby really was and the belief that it would be inappropriate to decide
whether or not to give care until the child's condition could be observed.
25. Miller v. HCA, Inc., 118 S.W.3d 758 (Tex. 2003).
26. Id. at 761.
27. Id. at 767-68.




The hospital asked Mr. Miller to sign a consent form to allow resuscita-
tion and he refused. The only option given to the Millers to prevent the
hospital from providing resuscitation was to remove Karla from the hos-
pital, which was not possible since it would be life threatening. 30
When circumstances made it necessary for the hospital to augment la-
bor to protect Karla's life, the Miller's child was born alive at a weight of
615 grams and a gestational age of twenty-three and one-seventh weeks.
The neonatologist then bagged and intubated Sidney to oxygenate her
blood. He then placed her on ventilation. Within a few days of her birth,
Sidney suffered a brain hemorrhage. The court described Sidney's condi-
tion at the time of trial as follows:
Sidney was seven years old and could not feed herself, or sit up on
her own. The evidence demonstrated the Sidney was legally blind,
suffered from sever mental retardation, cerebral palsy, seizures, and
spastic quadri paresis in her limbs. She could not be toilet-trained
and required a shunt in her brain to drain fluids that accumulate
there and needed care twenty-four hours a day. The evidence fur-
ther demonstrated that her circumstances would not change.3 1
The grounds for the Miller's claims of battery and negligence were that
the hospital "not only resuscitated Sidney, but performed experimental
procedures and administered experimental drugs, without which, in all
reasonable medical probability, Sidney would not have survived. ' 32 The
trial court put questions to the jury about the hospital's conduct, and the
jury found that the hospital's and HCA's negligence proximately caused
the Miller's damages. The jury further concluded that HCA and the hos-
pital were grossly negligent and that the Hospital acted with malice.
Their verdict for $29,400,000 in actual damages, $17,503,066 in prejudg-
ment interest, and $13,500,000 in exemplary damages clearly demon-
strated that they were appalled by HCA's conduct.
Upon appeal, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment,
concluding that the Natural Death Act 33 allowed parents to withhold
medical treatment for a child whose condition is certifiably terminal, but
not for a child whose condition was non-terminal. Based upon this con-
clusion the appellate court ruled that if a "child's condition has not been
certified as terminal, a health care provider is under no duty to follow a
parent's instruction to withhold urgently-needed life-sustaining medical
treatment from their child."'34 The appellate court further ruled that,
while a court order would generally be required when a parent does not
consent, no such order would be required in these circumstances because
a court is not equipped to make a choice between impairment and death.
On this basis, the appellate court ruled that HCA had no tort duty to "(a)
30. Miller, 118 S.W.3d at 762-63.
31. Id. at 763-64.
32. Id. at 764.
33. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 166.001-.166 (Vernon 2001 & Supp. 2004).
34. HCA, Inc. v. Miller ex rel. Miller, 36 S.W.3d 187, 195 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2000), affd on other grounds, 118 S.W.3d 758 (Tex. 2003).
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refrain from resuscitating Sidney; (b) have no policy requiring resusci-
tating of patients like Sidney without consent; and c) have policies
prohibiting resuscitation of patients like Sidney without consent. '35
In reviewing the appeals court decision, the supreme court examined
the legislative and judicial history regarding parental control of the medi-
cal treatment for their children. At issue are competing interests between
the presumption that parents are the appropriate decision-makers regard-
ing medical treatment of their children and the state's role as parens pa-
triae, permitting it to intercede in parental decision-making under certain
circumstances. While the supreme court recognized that the "[g]eneral
rule in Texas is that a physician who provides treatment without consent
commits a battery, '36 Justice Enoch also pointed out that there were ex-
ceptions such as when the patient is unconscious. In Moss v. Rishworth,
the court had held that it was legally wrong for a physician to treat a
minor without the parent's consent even when there was "an absolute
necessity for a prompt operation, but not emergent in the sense that
death would likely result immediately upon failure to perform it."'37 Thus
the supreme court found that Moss implied an exception to liability that
"arises only in emergent circumstances when there is no time to consult
the parents or seek court intervention if the parents withhold consent
before death is likely to result to the child."'38
The Millers argued that the exception defined by Justice Enoch's opin-
ion would not apply to the facts of the case. They pointed out that the
discussion as to whether or not to treat Sidney had gone on for several
hours prior to her birth and that the hospital staff had time to meet and
discuss the issue. Justice Enoch countered that these discussions were not
pertinent since Sidney's condition could not be determined with certainty
until she was born, and Dr. Otero was faced with emergent circumstances
when he treated Sidney. The supreme court's logic is founded on the
premise that the "circumstances" related to Sidney's treatment did not
arise until she was born. The issue of whether consent for Ms. Miller's
procedure was fraudulently obtained was not before the supreme court.
One might presume that had she known her wishes regarding the baby
were not going to be followed, she may have declined treatment and
wished transfer.
C. FILIAL CONSORTIUM
In Roberts v. Williamson,39 the Texas Supreme Court examined the is-
sue of whether there is a common-law cause of action for loss of filial
35. Id. at 196.
36. Miller, 118 S.W.3d at 767 (citing Gravis v. Physicians & Surgeons Hosp., 427
S.W.2d 310, 311 (Tex. 1968)).
37. Moss v. Rishworth, 222 S.W. 225, 226 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1920, judgm't adopted).
38. Miller, 118 S.W.3d at 768.
39. Roberts v. Williamson, 111 S.W.3d 113 (Tex. 2003).
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consortium. 40 A jury found that the plaintiffs' negligence was the proxi-
mate cause of the condition of the plaintiffs' child, which included
"mental retardation, anti-social-behavior, and ... partial paralysis of one
side of the body."'41 As part of the jury's award of $3,010,001 in damages,
the plaintiffs were awarded $75,000 for past loss of filial consortium and
one dollar for future loss.
According to Justice Phillips' opinion in Roberts, parents are not enti-
tled to a claim for loss of consortium for children that have been seriously
injured. This conclusion was reached despite the fact that in Sanchez v.
Schindler,42 the supreme court had ruled that parents are entitled to re-
covery for loss of consortium in wrongful death cases. Even further com-
plicating the issue is the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Reagan v.
Vaughn 43 in which it held that a child was entitled to recover for loss of
consortium when a parent suffers serious injury.
The court of appeals noted that the supreme court in Reagan had iden-
tified a special relationship between parent and child that deserved "spe-
cial protection" and therefore concluded that such a protection should
flow in reverse as well. Justice Phillips in Roberts, however, made a dis-
tinction between the two relationships, finding that:
Although parents customarily enjoy the consortium of their children,
in the ordinary course of events a parent does not depend on a child's
companionship, love, support, guidance, and nurture in the same way
and to the same degree that a husband depends on his wife, a wife
depends on her husband, or a minor or disabled adult child depends
on his or her parent.44
Recognizing that this distinction conflicts with the supreme court's ruling
in Sanchez, Justice Phillips argued that, as a policy matter, when a child
dies the tortfeasor should not be excused from liability simply because
the victim is not alive to collect damages. Since a child who survives can
hold the tortfeasor accountable, the supreme court did not find it neces-
sary to allow a parent compensation in that instance. 45
The supreme court viewed its decision as a determination of whether or
not to recognize a new cause of action and a new duty. It therefore stated
that it was necessary to perform a kind of "cost-benefit analysis" 46 to
reach its conclusion. According to Justice Phillips, "the fundamental
purposes of our tort system are to deter wrongful conduct, shift losses to
responsible parties, and fairly compensate deserving victims. '47 He recog-
nized that the "shifting loss" purpose would be clearly met by recognizing
40. Filial consortium is defined as "[a] child's society, affection, and companionship
given to a parent." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 304 (7th ed. 1999).
41. Roberts, 111 S.W.3d at 115.
42. Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 251 (Tex. 1983).
43. Reagan v. Vaughn, 804 S.W.2d 463, 468 (Tex. 1990).
44. Roberts, 111 S.W.3d at 117.
45. Id. at 119-20.




a cause of action, but did not recognize the applicability of the other two
purposes. While it is debatable whether deterrence will be accomplished
by recognizing many causes of action, a jury could certainly determine
that parents whose children are severely injured are deserving victims
who might be entitled to compensation in certain circumstances.
In summing up its opinion, the supreme court stated "that no compel-
ling social policy impels us to recognize a parent's right to damages for
the loss of filial consortium. ' 48 This conclusion was made by disapprov-
ing several lower court rulings.4 9 While certainly the dynamics of a par-
ent-child relationship are not the same as a spouse-spouse relationship
and parents are not generally dependant upon their child in the same way
as a child depends on its parent, there seem to be other elements of con-
sortium that are being ignored. Certainly, the supreme court recognized
in Sanchez that compensating parents in wrongful death cases would be
justified by the goals of the tort system. This begs the question as to why
it would not apply in circumstances such as these where the jury found
that the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the severe
and persistent incapacity of the parent's child.
Justice Jefferson, joined by Justice Schneider and Justice O'Neill, dis-
sented, noting that the supreme court's decision "creates, but does not
adequately justify, a prominent paradox in Texas law."'50 In his analysis,
Justice Jefferson noted the four major extensions in common law permit-
ting claims of consortium: a wife's separate consortium claim; a parent's
consortium claim for a child's death; a child's consortium claim for a par-
ent's death; and a child's consortium claim for a parent's serious, perma-
nent injury. In his opinion the supreme court was creating an "anomaly
in Texas law" 51 and that failed to do a "meaningful examination of Texas'
consortium precedent, the importance that Texas has historically placed
on the parent-child relationship, or this [c]ourt's decisions analogizing
that relationship to the reciprocal nature of the husband-wife
relationship. 52
As Justice Jefferson points out, the underlying fear that Justice Phillips
expresses in his decision is that a common-law right of filial consortium
will not be applied with consistency by the courts. His response, quoting
an Arizona court, is an eloquent explanation of the chronic disease in-
fecting the Texas tort law system:
This [mantra], of course is the hue and cry in many tort cases and in
essence is no more than the fear that some cases will be decided
48. Id. at 120.
49. See Schindler Elevator Corp. v. Anderson, 78 S.W.3d 392, 414 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. dism'd by agr.) (approving award of filial consortium); Enochs v.
Brown, 872 S.W.2d 312, 322 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, no writ) (recognizing parent's right
to filial consortium); see also Parkway Hosp. v. Lee, 946 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1997, writ denied).
50. Roberts, 111 S.W.3d at 125.




badly. Undoubtedly, the system will not decide each case correctly
in this field, just as it does not in any field, but here, as in other areas
of tort law, it [is] better to adopt a rule which will enable courts to
strive for justice in all cases rather than to rely upon one which will
ensure injustice to many.5 3
While the supreme court has repeatedly recognized the strong and
unique relationship between parent and child and has recognized in Rea-
gan that compensation is justified when that relationship is harmed due to
tortious actions, the Roberts court has foreclosed the ability of juries to
weigh the facts of a case to determine the justification for compensation
when the child is severely injured. In Texas, a parent can recover his or
her loss if a child dies, but is left with no compensation if his or her child
lies in a vegetative state for thirty years. Under which circumstance
would the parent suffer more?
D. EMPLOYEE DRUG TESTING: DUTY OF CARE
In Mission Petroleum Carriers, Inc. v. Solomon, the Texas Supreme
Court examined whether there is a common-law duty owed by an em-
ployer conducting urine specimen testing for drugs pursuant to Depart-
ment of Transportation ("DOT") guidelines. 54 Mission Petroleum
Carriers, Inc. ("Mission") required its truck drivers to submit to drug test-
ing under the guidelines of DOT regulations. 55 These guidelines contain
specific protocols for the collection process. In collecting a sample from
the plaintiff, Roy Solomon ("Solomon"), Mission violated several of
these protocols. Solomon's test came back positive for THC. When he
was informed by a Medical Review Officer ("MRO"), Solomon asserted
that the result was impossible because he had never used marijuana. A
second portion of Solomon's sample was sent to a separate laboratory.
THC was found once again. Solomon was terminated by Mission as a
result of these tests.5 6
Under DOT regulations, a prospective employer of a truck driver must
review the drug test results of an applicant from previous employers for
the previous two years. 57 Thus, when Solomon attempted to gain employ-
ment as a truck driver from another employer, they submitted a request
form to Mission and determined that he had failed a prior drug test. On
this basis, Solomon could not find employment as a truck-driver
elsewhere. 58
At trial, the jury found Mission guilty of negligence and awarded Solo-
mon damages for medical care, loss of earning capacity, and mental
anguish totaling $802,444.22 as well as $100,000 in exemplary damages on
53. Id. at 128 (quoting Univ. of Ariz. Health Scis. Ctr. v. Sup. Ct., 667 P.2d 1294, 1298
(1983)).
54. Mission Petroleum Carriers, Inc. v. Solomon, 106 S.W.3d 705 (Tex. 2003).
55. 49 C.F.R. §§ 40.1-.39, 382.305 (1996).
56. Mission Petroleum Carriers, Inc., 106 S.W.3d at 707.
57. 49 C.F.R. §§ 382.405(f), .413(a)(1)(d) (1996).
58. Mission Petroleum Carriers, Inc., 106 S.W.3d at 707.
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a finding that Mission acted with malice. The trial court's ruling was af-
firmed by the court of appeals, which held that "Mission owed its em-
ployees a duty to use reasonable care in the collection of urine samples
for drug testing."'59
In deciding whether or not to impose a duty in these circumstances, the
supreme court reviewed the applicable regulations extensively. It noted
that there were several options for Solomon to address Mission's failure
to follow DOT protocols and that Solomon was provided with guidelines
that were dictated by DOT regulations when he was hired. According to
Justice Jefferson, the ultimate responsibility of validating the test rested
with the MRO, who could invalidate the test based upon improper han-
dling. He noted that Solomon did not avail himself of two procedural
protections. First, Solomon signed a Custody and Control Form, without
which the MRO "cannot confirm the chain of custody and must contact
the employee to discuss the positive result. ' 60 Second, he did not "dis-
close to the MRO Mission's alleged malfeasance during the collection
process."' 6' The supreme court further noted that Solomon could have
filed a complaint with the Associate Administrator for the Federal High-
way Administration and that Mission could "have been fined $10,000, lost
its ability to obtain insurance, or received an unsatisfactory safety rat-
ing."'62 What Justice Jefferson failed to realize is that Solomon probably
would have been fired had he taken those actions.
The supreme court recognized that Solomon was asserting a valid inter-
est in protecting the possibility of gaining future employment from the
negligent handling of urine samples under the DOT regulations. But the
supreme court found, however, that it was "not persuaded that case-by-
case adjudication of collection procedures through tort litigation would
serve the broader interest Solomon quite properly seeks to protect. ' 63
Rather it was determined that "the DOT's comprehensive statutory and
regulatory scheme, coupled with the authority granted to the MRO, af-
fords significant protection to employees who are the subject of random
drug tests."'64
Much of Mission's arguments relied on the premise that Solomon was
an at-will employee that Mission could discharge at any time, and there-
fore, it was under no duty to handle the drug test under any protocol.
Solomon's claims, however, were not based upon wrongful termination,
but rather that Mission's duty was to not destroy his potential for employ-
ment in his chosen field. Justice Jefferson focused his analysis on whether
acknowledging such a duty comported with the federal statutory scheme
and Texas common law. Despite this fact, the supreme court still ex-
59. Mission Petroleum Carriers, Inc. v. Solomon 37 S.W.3d 482, 488 (Tex. App.-
Beaumont, 2001), rev'd 106 S.W.3d 705 (2003).
60. Mission Petroleum Carriers, Inc., 106 S.W.3d at 713-14.
61. Id. at 714
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 715.
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amined the at-will aspects of the issue, stating that it needed to approach
the claim in its proper context. The supreme court equated the drug test
to any other investigation that an employer may conduct concerning an
employee prior to termination and that no duty of care would be imposed
in those circumstances, regardless of whether or not it had an effect on
the employee's chances for future employment. Justices Enoch, Phillips,
and O'Neill in a concurring opinion found it unnecessary to discuss the
issue of employment at-will. It is unclear whether the supreme court's
comments in this area were mere dicta or if it is actually stating that it
would not be willing to "impose common-law liability on an employer
who conveys false information that results in its former employee being
unemployable in his chosen career. '65
Judge Schneider in a concurring opinion differed with the supreme
court's reluctance to impose a common-law duty that would interfere
with the DOT regulations. He argued that the supreme court is in es-
sence ruling that the regulations preempt common-law duty without do-
ing the "usual preemption analysis. ' 66 While stating the belief that a
common-law duty could coexist with the regulations, Judge Schneider
found that Solomon's claims should have been denied based upon causa-
tion. He argued that there was no evidence to prove that any of Mission's
alleged violations of protocol proximately caused an improper test result.
The result for Mr. Solomon is that false statements regarding his past
drug use are free to be published by his former employer with impunity.
E. APPLICABILITY OF COMMON CARRIER STATUS
The courts in the past have identified a special class of transportation
services that is called "common carriers." This class is defined as "those
in the business of carrying passengers and goods who hold themselves out
for hire by the public."'67 This standard is "that degree of care that would
be exercised by a very cautious and prudent person under the same or
similar circumstances. '6 8
In Speed Boat Leasing, Inc., v. Elmer, the Texas Supreme Court ex-
amined whether or not a service offering rides in the Gulf on a speedboat
would qualify as a common carrier.69 The supreme court asserted that
the key to identifying a common carrier is to look to the "primary func-
tion" 70 of the service provider. According to the supreme court the ques-
tion is "whether the business of the entity is public transportation or
whether such transportation is 'only incidental' to its primary business. ' 71
65. Id. at 717.
66. Id.
67. Mount Pleasant Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Lindburg, 766 S.W.2d 208, 213 (Tex. 1989); see
also Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Travis, 125 Tex. 11, 78 S.W.2d 941, 942 (1935).
68. Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co., 78 S.W.2d at 942.
69. Speed Boat Leasing, Inc. v. Elmer, 124 S.W.3d 210 (Tex. 2003).
70. Id. at 213.




The facts of the case were that Doris Elmer, the plaintiff, was a sev-
enty-year-old woman who was offered a ride on a boat operated by
Speed Boat Leasing, Inc. ("Speed Boat") called the "Gulf Screamer" in
exchange for allowing Speed Boat to advertise in the office of the condo-
minium she managed. The speedboat operator warned Elmer that the
ride would be rougher in the front of the boat, but Elmer chose to sit
there anyway. It was the captain's testimony that Elmer was given safety
instructions prior to the ride, although Elmer denied this. Due to the
jolting that occurred while Elmer rode in the front, her spine was
fractured. 72
At trial Elmer requested that the jury be instructed to apply the higher
standard of care owed by a common carrier. The trial court declined to
do so and gave the instruction for simple negligence instead. The jury
assigned thirty-five percent negligence to Speedboat and sixty-five per-
cent negligence to Elmer, and as a result, the court awarded nothing. On
appeal, it was held that the standard for a common carrier should have
been applied and the case was reversed and remanded.
The supreme court determined that "although Speed Boat Leasing
transports its passengers across the waters of the Gulf of Mexico, its pri-
mary purpose is to entertain, not to transport from place to place."' 73 The
supreme court emphasized the fact that the passengers' points of depar-
ture and arrival were the same and that the primary attraction of the rides
was "to supply passengers with an exhilarating fun ride."'74 Also empha-
sized was the extensive references in Speed Boat's advertising that re-
ferred to a "THRILLING" and "SCREAMING" ride. The supreme
court likened the rides offered by Speed Boat to an amusement park ride,
comparing them to the definition of an amusement ride in a Texas statute:
"a mechanical device that carries passengers along, around, or over a
fixed or restricted course or within a defined area for the purpose of giv-
ing the passengers amusement, pleasure, or excitement. '75 The supreme
court then went on to note that courts have applied a standard of ordi-
nary care to providers of amusement rides.76
F. PREMISES DEFECTS LIABILITY: ACTUAL
KNOWLEDGE REQUIREMENT
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., v. Miller was a premises defect case in which the
Texas Supreme Court examined whether a trial court's grant of a judg-
ment not withstanding the verdict ("JNOV") was valid on the issue of
actual knowledge. 77 The supreme court stated that the duty of a licensor
72. Id. at 211.
73. Id. at 213.
74. Id.
75. TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 2151.002(1) (Vernon 2004).
76. Speed Boat Leasing, Inc., 124 S.W.3d at 213 (citing see, e.g., Scroggins v. Harlingen,
112 S.W.2d 1035, 1038 (Tex. 1938), judgm't set aside on reh'g by, 131 Tex. 237, 249, 114
S.W.2d 853).
77. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Miller, 102 S.W.3d 706 (Tex. 2003).
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to a licensee regarding a premises defect is the following:
It is well settled in this State that if the person injured was on the
premises as a licensee, the duty that the proprietor or licensor owed
him was not to injure him by willful, wanton, or gross negligence....
An exception to the general rule is that when the licensor has knowl-
edge of a dangerous condition, and the licensee does not, a duty is
owed on the part of the licensor to either warn the licensee or to
make the condition reasonably safe.
78
The trial court had granted a motion for JNOV after the jury had found
Wal-Mart seventy percent negligent and Miller thirty percent negligent.
On appeal Miller argued that the JNOV was improper because there was
some evidence that he lacked knowledge of the dangerous condition.
79
Brian Miller worked for a plumbing company that was hired by Wal-
Mart to install an eyewash machine in the mechanics bay of one of its
stores. Miller was escorted to a storeroom inside which was a stairway
leading to the water lines and shutoff valve. Miller noticed at this time
that Wal-Mart employees were unloading boxes and stacking them on the
stairs. On the way up the stairs, "Miller noticed the stairs were 'kind of
slippery or slick' and that boxes were stacked along both sides of the
stairway's middle section."'80 Upon descent, Miller's coworker warned
him "to be careful of the stairs because they were kind of slippery." 81
Miller held onto the handrail on the way down, but when he reached the
boxes it became necessary to let go so that he could pass through them.
Miller caught his foot on one of the boxes and he slipped on a step and
fell. s2
Miller's argument on appeal of the JNOV was that while he was aware
that the boxes were present on the stairs, he had not realized the danger
that they presented. This seems logical since it was the boxes blocking his
descent, combined with his inability to grasp the handrail, combined with
the slippery stairs that created the dangerous condition that led to his fall.
Certainly, he could not have recognized this hazardous collection of cir-
cumstances until he had already entered the area.83 This parallels the
appeals court's ruling that it was reasonable to infer that Miller did not
fully comprehend the danger created by the various dangerous conditions
that existed. 84
The supreme court held that Miller had actual knowledge of all of the
factors that created the condition that Miller complained of, and there-
fore, there was no evidence "to support the jury's finding that Miller did




82. Id. at 708.
83. This would seem to be analogous to knowing the condition of a newborn only after
birth. See Miller v. HCA, Inc., 118 S.W.3d 758, 762 (Tex. 2003).
84. Wal-Mart, 102 S.W.3d at 708 (citing Miller v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc, 54 S.W.3d 481
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001)).
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not know about the dangerous condition. '85 Miller's argument, however,
was that he did not fully appreciate the danger posed by this condition
until he was already in the precarious position of trying to descend on wet
steps, while being unable to grasp the handrail. The supreme court ap-
peared to hold that as long as Miller knew about the factors that made
the condition dangerous, it was not necessary for him to fully appreciate
the danger created by these factors in combination in order to be ascribed
actual knowledge. This is a classic example of the Texas Supreme Court
violating the constitutional prohibition against it finding and/or reviewing
factual sufficiency.
G. WORKER'S COMPENSATION ACT: EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE STATUS
Under the exclusive remedies provision of the Worker's Compensation
Act,8 6 "recovery of worker's compensation benefits is the exclusive rem-
edy of an employee covered by worker's compensation insurance cover-
age or a legal beneficiary against the employer or an agent or employee
of the employer for the death of or a work-related injury sustained by the
employee. ' 87 In Wingfoot Enterprises, v. Alvarado,88 the question before
the supreme court was whether the provision should apply to two em-
ployers when one employer is a general employer and the second em-
ployer is "one who has become an employer by controlling the details of
a worker's work at the time of injury." 89
Marleny Alvarado was an employee of Wingfoot d/b/a Tandem Staffing
("Tandem") that was in the business of employing workers and providing
temporary labor to companies. In this case the defendant was assigned to
work for Web Assembly, Inc. ("Web"). Tandem maintained most of the
responsibilities of an employer regarding its employees. It was responsi-
ble for "hiring, screening, and terminating employees sent to Web." 90 In
addition, Tandem was "responsible for paying the employee's salaries,
unemployment taxes, social security taxes, and for withholding federal
income taxes." 9' Furthermore, Tandem had supervisors who remained on
site and oversaw the workers that it provided. While Web was the super-
visor of specific tasks performed by Tandem's employees, it was Tandem
that determined which tasks were performed by which employee.9 2
When Alvarado was injured on the job at Web, she sued both Tandem
and Web for negligence. Prior to trial, Tandem moved for and was
awarded summary judgment based on the exclusive remedy clause of the
Worker's Compensation Act. Alvarado appealed the trial court's ruling
and the court of appeals reversed. The appeals court ruling was based on
85. Id. at 710.
86. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 401.001 et seq. (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2004).
87. Id. § 408.001(a).
88. Wingfoot Enters. v. Alvarado, 111 S.W.3d 134 (Tex. 2003).
89. Id. at 139.





Archem Co. v. Austin Indus., Inc. which held that when "one entity 'bor-
rows' another's employee, workers' compensation law identifies one
party as the 'employer' and treats all others as third parties. ' 93 According
to the appeals court, a "right to control" test should be applied, and a jury
could find that either Tandem or Web was Alvarado's employer. 94 The
supreme court recognized that there were conflicting opinions in the
lower courts on the issue and granted petition to resolve the confusion.
Alvarado's argument was that she was an employee of Tandem up until
the point that Web "took control of details of her work."9 5 At that point,
Alvarado argued, she became a "borrowed employee" of Web and that
under the statute one party should be identified as her employer and the
rest should be considered third parties. The supreme court took the ap-
proach of examining the statute to determine whether both Tandem and
Web could both be considered employers of Alvarado and therefore lim-
ited to liability under the worker's compensation act. According to Jus-
tice Owen, Alvarado fell within the definition of "employee" under the
Act for both Tandem and Web. Additionally, Justice Owen found that
Alvarado's activities at the time of her injury fell under the Act's defini-
tion for "course and scope of employment" 96 for both Tandem and Web.
In analyzing the issue, Justice Owen looked to the language of the stat-
ute as well as legislation in related areas. She noted that the definitions
of employer and employee in the act do not "expressly foreclose the pos-
sibility that there may be more than one employer."' 97 Further validation
for the concept of dual employers was found in other provisions of the
Texas Labor Code. First, she observed that the Code recognized "tempo-
rary common worker employer[s]" and "user[s] of common workers." 98
The only apparent relevance being that the legislature knows this sort of
thing is going on. How this bears on the determination of whether both
parties would be simultaneously considered employers for purposes of
the Worker's Compensation Act is difficult to comprehend.
Perhaps more on point, the supreme court noted that the Code "recog-
nizes that a general contractor may procure workers' compensation cov-
erage for subcontractors and subcontractors' employees." 99 It also noted
that under this circumstance the general contractor could be the em-
ployer of the "subcontractor's employee only for purposes of the
worker's compensation laws of this state."10 0 According to the supreme
court, it could take two things from the Labor Code. First, it expressly
93. Archem Co. v. Austin Indus., Inc., 804 S.W.2d 268, 269 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1991, no writ).
94. Alvarado v. Wingfoot Enterprises, 53 S.W.3d 720 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
2001), judgm't rev'd, 111 S.W.3d 134 (Tex. 2003) (citing Tex. Workers' Comp. Ins. Fund v.
Del Indus., Inc., 35 S.W.3d 591 (Tex. 2000); Archem, 804 S.W.2d at 270).
95. Wingfoot Enterprises, 111 S.W.3d at 138.
96. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.012(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2004).
97. Wingfoot Enterprises, 111 S.W.3d at 139-45.
98. Id. at 140 (citing TEx. LAB. CODE ANN. § 92.002(7) (Vernon Supp. 2004)).
99. Id. at 141 (citing TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.123(a) (Vernon 2003)).
100. Id. (citing TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.123(e) (Vernon 2003)).
2004] 1143
SMU LAW REVIEW
recognizes the existence of temporary employment agencies and, second,
it does not "abhor the concept of two employers for workers' compensa-
tion purposes."'10 1
Justice Owen then made reference to the Staff Leasing Services Act
("SLSA").10 2 While it noted that this Act applied to situations "in which
the employee's assignment is intended to be of a long-term or continuing
nature, ' 10 3 and Tandem assigned Alvarado to Web as a temporary em-
ployee, the supreme court looked to the SLSA for guidance. According
to the supreme court, under the SLSA, the leasing company, which would
correspond to Tandem in this case, has a choice to elect coverage by
workers' compensation for both itself and its client. If it chooses not to
elect coverage, then both the leasing company and its client would be
subject to common-law negligence. From this Act the supreme court in-
ferred a general policy to "encourage employers to obtain workers' com-
pensation insurance coverage by providing benefits to the employer"1 0 4
and by "provid[ing] disincentives" 10 5 if the employer doesn't elect
coverage.
The supreme court then went on to examine the merits of the "right-to-
control" doctrine asserted by Alvarado. The tenets of the doctrine were
enunciated in two cases cited by and disapproved by the supreme court,
Smith v. Otis Engineering Corp.10 6 and Archem Co. v. Austin Industrial,
Inc. 107 According to both decisions the law "require[s] that one party be
named the employer and all others be classified as third parties outside
the purview of the workers' compensation law. '10 8 The supreme court
took issue with these decisions, arguing that the employee and the em-
ployers in these circumstances would each fall within the definitions of
the Worker's Compensation Act, and therefore the Act should apply.
The supreme court preferred the approach of Texas Industrial Contrac-
tors, Inc. v. Ammean, 0 9 stating "that [when] a worker is hired by one
company that has contracted to do work for another, that company has a
workers' compensation policy, and the worker receives benefits under
that policy following an award by the Texas Workers' Compensation
Commission, the worker's common-law claim against that company is
barred by the [Labor Code's] exclusive remedy provision, even if control
over the details of the work is in the hands of the other company with
101. Id. at 142.
102. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 91.001 (Vernon 2004).
103. Wingfoot Enterprises, 111 S.W.3d at 140 (quoting TEX. LAB. CODE ANN.
§ 91.001(14) (Vernon 2003)).
104. Id. at 142.
105. Id.
106. Smith v. Otis Engineering Corp., 670 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. App-Houston [1st Dist.]
1984, no writ).
107. Archem Co. v. Austin Indus., Inc., 804 S.W.2d 268, 268 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1991, no writ).
108. Smith, 670 S.W.2d at 751.




which that company has contracted." 110 Thus, the supreme court deter-
mined that applying this approach to Alvarado's case would give "effect
to the policy behind the workers' compensation statute which deprives
the injured employee of a subscriber of many common-law rights in re-
turn for prompt compensation benefits and medical treatment."' 1 The
obvious theme in this decision is to cram as many circumstances as possi-
ble into statutory liability, in order to avoid common-law torts.
H. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS: EXTREME
AND OUTRAGEOUS CONDUCT
In Tiller v. McLure," 2 the Texas Supreme Court addressed intentional
infliction of emotional distress. The elements that must be proven are
"(1) the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly; (2) the defendant's
conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) the defendant's actions caused
the plaintiff emotional distress; and (4) the resulting emotional distress
was severe." 3 The trial court had rendered a judgment not withstanding
the verdict against the plaintiff and the appeals court had reversed that
decision concluding that "there was some evidence of extreme and outra-
geous conduct, because, despite his knowledge that Barbara McLure was
susceptible to emotional distress, Tiller 'engage[d] in a course of conduct
that a jury could have reasonably believed to be harassing, intimidating,
bullying, and extreme.""' 14
The issue before the supreme court was whether there was no evidence
to support a finding that the conduct of the defendant, Billie Tiller, was
"extreme and outrageous." The facts of the case were that Tiller had
contracted with a company owned and run by Barbara McLure's husband
to have construction done on his property. After the project began,
McLure's husband was diagnosed with a brain tumor and was no longer
able to work on the project. McLure sent a letter to Tiller explaining the
circumstances and notifying him that their son Jack McLure would be
taking charge and to contact him "with any questions, comments, or con-
cerns regarding the project."115 Tiller's reaction to the circumstances
could hardly be described as understanding. Upon receiving the letter, he
called Barbara and "raised hell with her."' 16 He threatened to terminate
the contract when the construction site was closed on the day of her hus-
band's funeral. Between December and March, he called Barbara "ap-
proximately sixty times," including "non-business hours," "late in the
evening, over the Christmas holidays, and once on a Sunday morning."11 7
110. Wingfoot Enterprises, 111 S.W.3d at 146.
111. Id. at 149.
112. Tiller v. McLure, 121 S.W.3d 709 (Tex. 2003).
113. Id. at 713 (citing Standard Fruit & Vegetable Co. v. Johnson, 985 S.W.2d 62, 65
(Tex. 1998)).
114. Id. (quoting McLure v. Tiller 63 S.W.3d 72 (Tex. App.-El Paso, 2001)), judgm't
rev'd, 121 S.W.3d 709 (Tex. 2003).
115. Id. at 711-12.




The supreme court described Tiller's tone on these phone calls to be
"consistently rude, demanding, and curt.' 1 8 Tiller was late making pay-
ments throughout the project, and he refused to make the final payment
of $36,958. At trial, the jury awarded McLure $500,000 in actual damages
and $1.5 million in punitive. 119
In determining that the evidence did not support a finding of "extreme
and outrageous" conduct, the supreme court noted that Tiller's calls
"were never excessive on one day, nor did Tiller consistently call Barbara
McLure at inappropriate times. ' 120 The supreme court also noted that
McLure was never physically threatened and no "vulgar or obscene lan-
guage"12 1 was used. The supreme court also noted that the behavior oc-
curred in a business context and that "Tiller's calls, while numerous and
unpleasant, related to the contracts" and "never directly attacked Bar-
bara McLure. 12 2 Therefore, the question was whether Tiller's "entire
course of conduct, viewed as a whole, was extreme and outrageous. '123
While the supreme court recognized that it had found a course of conduct
was "extreme and outrageous as a matter of law" in prior rulings, it
noted that it was not only "regularity" that was a factor, but also severity.
According to the supreme court, "Tiller's course of conduct in this com-
mercial contract dispute was not severe enough to constitute extreme and
outrageous conduct."1 24
I. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
1. Tort Claims Act: Definition of "Use"
In Dallas Area Rapid Transit v. Whitley,1 2 5 the Texas Supreme Court
examined whether the Tort Claims Act 126 waived sovereign immunity in a
unique fact situation where a passenger on a bus was injured by another
passenger after he had been left stranded by the bus driver. Under the
Act "a governmental unit's sovereign immunity is waived for 'property
damage, personal injury, and death proximately caused by the wrongful
act or omission or the negligence of an employee acting within his scope
of employment if: (A) the property damage, personal injury, or death
arises from the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle or motor-
driven equipment."' 127
While the injuries to the plaintiff, Harold Whitley, were inflicted by
another passenger that was out of the control of the transit authority's
118. Id.
119. Id. at 713.




124. Id. at 715.
125. Dallas Area Rapid Transit v. Whitley, 104 S.W.3d 540 (Tex. 2003).
126. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101 (Vernon 2003).
127. Dallas Area Rapid. Transit, 104 S.W.3d at 542 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE § 101.021 (Vernon 1997)).
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agent, a closer examination of the facts reveals that the actions of its
agent created the circumstances that put Mr. Whitley in danger. Whitley
has cerebral palsy and is dependant on Dallas Area Rapid Transit
(DART) for transportation. While riding on one of DART's buses, an-
other passenger, Mary Burkley, sat behind him and began "verbally
harassing [him], eventually threatening him with a box cutter."'1 28 After
Whitley and Burkley got in a tussle, the two were separated. Burkley had
to be restrained from assaulting Whitley once again, and eventually the
bus driver decided to stop the bus and order, Whitley to exit, saying "he
would come back for him in a few minutes."'1 29 Burkely then exited the
bus a couple of blocks later, went home and got reinforcements. The
group located Whitley where the bus had dropped him off and proceeded
to beat him so badly that he ended up in the hospital for ten days.
The case came to the supreme court after the trial court had granted
DART's plea to the jurisdiction based upon sovereign immunity. The
court of appeals had reversed, holding that the injuries that Whitley suf-
fered resulted from DART's use of the bus because "the driver chose to
force Whitley off the bus and then dropped his attacker off near where
Whitley was waiting, and decided to go on without returning to pick up
Whitley as promised. '130 On appeal the supreme court held that sover-
eign immunity was not waived in this case because Whitley's "injuries
arose from the bus driver's failure to supervise the public, which is insuffi-
cient to waive immunity under the Tort Claims Act. ' '1 3t According to the
supreme court the test is whether there is a "nexus between the operation
or use of the motor-driven vehicle or equipment and a plaintiff's inju-
ries."1 32 It went on to state that "[t]he nexus requires more than mere
involvement of property"'133 and that "the [vehicle]'s use must have actu-
ally caused the injury."' 34
Thus, the supreme court focused on the issue of causation and noted
that "use of a motor vehicle does not cause injury if it does no more than
furnish the condition that makes the injury possible. ' 135 Absent from the
supreme court's analysis of the facts is that the bus driver made a decision
to stop the bus and make Whitley exit into hazardous conditions. Fur-
thermore, the driver did not return to pick up Whitley as he had prom-
128. Id. at 541.
129. Id. at 542.
130. Whitley v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 66 S.W.3d 472, 476 (Tex. App.-Dallas,
2001), rev'd, 104 S.W.3d 540 (Tex. 2003).
131. Dallas Area Rapid. Transit, 104 S.W.3d at 542-43.
132. Id. at 543 (citing Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n v. White, 46 S.W.3d 864,
869 (Tex. 2001); LeLeaux v. Hamshire-Fannet Indep. Sch. Dist., 835 S.W.2d 49, 51 (Tex.
1992) ("The phrase 'arises from' requires a nexus between the injury negligently caused by
a governmental employee and the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle or piece of
equipment."); Hopkins v. Spring Indep. Sch. Dist., 736 S.W.2d 617, 619 (Tex. 1987)).
133. Id. at 543 (citing Dallas County Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. Bossley,
968 S.W.2d 339, 343 (Tex.1998)).
134. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comn'n, 46 S.W.3d at 869 (citing Dallas County
Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 968 S.W.2d at 342-43 (Tex. 1998)).
135. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 104 S.W.3d at 543.
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ised, leaving him in an extremely dangerous and helpless position. The
driver's improper actions did not relate to "failure to supervise the pub-
lic," but rather the decision to stop the bus, abandon Whitley in dire cir-
cumstances and not use the bus to return for him. All this after being
compensated to transport him to his destination. While certainly it can
be argued that Whitley's injuries were a result of the driver's failure to
use the bus in an appropriate manner, it would appear that a "nexus"
between Whitley's injury and this improper use does exist. Certainly the
legislature recognized in the Tort Claims Act that when the government
undertakes to operate motor vehicles, it should accept liability when
those vehicles are operated negligently. It would then seem logical that a
jury should be entitled to determine whether or not a plaintiff's injuries
are the result of negligent operation of a vehicle regardless of whether
the act is viewed as affirmative or not.
The issue of the term "use" in the TTCA again arose in an appellate
court's ruling in Brown v. Houston Independent School District.136 Again
at issue was whether or not governmental immunity was waived because
an injury "arises from the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle.' 37
The Texas Supreme Court made a point in this ruling to emphasize that it
had previously requested the legislature to clarify the meaning of "use" in
this context to no avail. Therefore, it determined that it should apply the
ordinary meaning of the word provided by Mount Pleasant Independent
School District v. Estate of Lindburg, "to put or bring into action or ser-
vice; to employ for or apply to a given purpose. 1' 38 It then looked to its
decision in Whitley for the premise that "the use must have actually
caused the injury.1 39
The facts of the case were that an on-duty Houston Independent
School District ("HISD") police officer, Leo Nicholas pulled over the
plaintiff, Brandi Hyde Brown. Nicholas then proceeded to make "sexu-
ally suggestive comments and forced [Brown] to lift her shirt."1 40 He then
ordered her to follow him in her truck to a school parking lot where he
sexually assaulted her in her truck. Brown sued HISD "alleging negli-
gence and gross negligence arising from Nicholas' use of the patrol car
and HISD's failure to supervise and monitor that use."1' 41 HISD was
granted an affirmative defense of governmental immunity and the ruling
was upheld on appeal.
The court referred to its holding in Holder v. Mellon Mortgage Co.,142
in which the court had stated that since the car was not the "direct de-
136. Brown v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 123 S.W.3d 618 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2003, no pet.).
137. TEX CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §101.021; see also §101.051.
138. Mount Pleasant Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Estate of Lindburg, 766 S.W.2d 208, 211 (Tex.
1989).
139. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 104 S.W.3d at 543; see also White, 46 S.W.3d at 869.
140. Brown, 123 S.W.3d at 619.
141. Id.
142. Holder v. Mellon Mortgage Co., 954 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1997), rev'd on other grounds, 5 S.W.3d (Tex. 1999).
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vice"' 143 causing the plaintiff's injury, the "required causal nexus for liabil-
ity under the TTCA is missing. ' 144 Again relying on a requirement of
causation the court reiterated its holding in Whitley that "the [vehicle]'s
use must have actually caused the injury. 1 45 The court further made the
tenuous analogy of the situation to prior rulings related to the term "use"
in insurance cases.
The police car furnished by HISD certainly cloaked Nicholas with gov-
ernmental authority. Nicholas certainly used the authority associated
with that vehicle to gain control over Brown and to assert control over
her. He then used that vehicle to lead her to a location where she was
vulnerable and he could commit his crime in the car itself. However,
under the court's restrictive definition of "use," Brown's opportunity for
justice is cut-off.
2. Patient's Bill of Rights: Waiver of Governmental Immunity?
In 2003, the Texas Supreme Court issued rulings in multiple cases, all of
which relied upon its holding in Wichita Falls State Hospital v. Taylor. 146
The question in those cases was whether the legislature had specifically
waived immunity in cases involving the Patient's Bill of Rights by enact-
ing Texas Health and Safety Code Section 321.003, which entitles a per-
son to sue for damages caused by a violation of the Patient's Bill of
Rights. 147 The hospital was denied immunity at the appellate level where
the court had ruled that "Section 321.003 constitutes a clear and unam-
biguous legislative waiver of immunity from suit."'148
At issue was the language in Section 321.003 that states:
(a) A treatment facility or mental health facility that violates a pro-
vision of, or a rule adopted under, this chapter ... is liable to a
person receiving care or treatment in or from the facility who is
harmed as a result of the violation.
(b) A person who has been harmed by a violation may sue for in-
junctive relief, damages, or both. 149
The supreme court noted that there was no explicit language waiving im-
munity in this section. Taylor argued, however, that the definitional sec-
tion of chapter 321 refers to Section 521.003 for the definition of "mental
health facility." Under that section "mental health facility" is defined as:
143. Brown, 123 S.W.3d at 620.
144. Id.
145. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 104 S.W.3d at 540 (citing White, 46 S.W.3d at 869).
146. Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692 (Tex. 2003); see also Austin
State Hosp. v. Fiske, 106 S.W.3d 703 (Tex. 2003); Cent. Counties Ctr. for Mental Health &
Mental Retardation Servs. v. Rodriguez, 106 S.W.3d 702 (Tex. 2003); Beaumont State Ctr.
v. Kozlowski, 108 S.W.3d 899 (Tex. 2003).
147. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 321.003 (Vernon 2001).
148. Wichita Falls State Hosp., 48 S.W.3d at 782.
149. § 321.003 (a), (b).
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(a) an inpatient or outpatient mental health facility operated by the
department, a federal agency, a political subdivision, or any
person;
(b) a community center or a facility operated by a community
center; or
(c) that identifiable part of a general hospital in which diagnosis,
treatment, and care for persons with mental illness is
provided. 150
The question for the supreme court then became "whether this incorpo-
rated definition is the functional equivalent of an explicit legislative direc-
tive waiving the State's immunity.1' 5 1
Prior to doing his analysis of the statute, Justice Jefferson looked at the
historical precedent regarding sovereign immunity and the state's subse-
quent waiver of immunity in specific circumstances. It noted that "for the
Legislature to waive the State's sovereign immunity, a statute or resolu-
tion must contain a clear and unambiguous expression of the Legisla-
ture's waiver of immunity." 152 However, it recognized that in certain
circumstances it had "found waiver of sovereign immunity absent 'magic
words.'"153 In those circumstances the supreme court cited four factors
that bear on the its determination of the issue:
(1) the statute must waive immunity "beyond doubt;"
(2) the supreme court will "generally resolve ambiguities by retain-
ing immunity;"
(3) if the statute requires that the State be joined in a lawsuit where
"immunity would otherwise attach," then immunity is waived;
and
(4) whether or not the State has simultaneously enacted "measures
to insulate public resources from the reach of judgment
creditors."15 4
In reference to the first factor, the supreme court argued that the Act
would not be rendered meaningless if immunity were not waived. It
noted that there would still be liability under the act against private facili-
ties. It further observed that the act was initially prompted by concern
over private facilities. Justice Jefferson further argued that to apply Tay-
lor's reasoning would indicate that the statute waived federal immunity,
something the Texas Legislature is not authorized to do. Regarding the
second factor, Justice Jefferson stated that the strongest indicator for im-
munity in this circumstance would be the ambiguity created by incorpo-
rating Section 571.003 into Section 321.001. Therefore, since the court
viewed the language to be ambiguous, the presumption against waiver of
immunity controlled. On the third factor, the court noted that there were
no provisions in the Patient's Bill of Rights that required the state to be
150. Id. § 571.003(12)(a)-(c).
151. Wichita Falls State Hosp., 106 S.W.3d at 799.
152. Id. at 696.
153. Id. at 697.
154. Id. at 697-98.
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joined as a party. Finally, the supreme court observed that waiving im-
munity in this case would "subject the state to indeterminate damage
awards"1 55 and therefore would be contrary to the fourth factor.
3. Tort Claims Act: Employee Status
In Murk v. Scheele,156 the issue was whether or not "[u]nder the Texas
Tort Claims Act, a person is not an employee of a governmental unit if
the person 'performs tasks the details of which the governmental unit
does not have legal rights to control.'"157 One of the defendants in this
case was Dr. Steven Murk who was a neurosurgeon at the University of
Texas Health Science Center ("UT"). The trial court had granted sum-
mary judgment to UT based upon governmental immunity. Murk then
moved for summary judgment on the grounds of the Act which states that
"a judgment in an action.. . under [the Act] bars any action involving the
same subject matter by the claimant against the employee of the govern-
mental unit whose act or omission gave rise to the claim. ' 158 Based upon
this language, the trial court granted summary judgment for Murk as well.
The Scheeles argued that while Murk was paid by UT, his "exercise of
independent judgment as a treating physician was outside UT's right of
control, thereby excluding him from the statutory definition of 'em-
ployee." 159 The Texas Supreme Court declined to agree. According to
the supreme court, "the Act's definition of 'employee' does not require
that a governmental unit control every detail of a person's work. ' 160
III. CAUSATION
In Marathon Corp. v. Pitzner,16 1 the Texas Supreme Court did a suffi-
ciency of the evidence review for a judgment rendered in favor of the
plaintiff, John Pitzner, which was upheld by the Corpus Christi Court of
Appeals. Pitzner was an air conditioning repairman that was repairing
units on the roof of a building leased by Marathon Corporation ("Mara-
thon"). All of Marathon's employees left while Pitzner was still working
on the air conditioners. Two hours later, "Pitzner was found semi-con-
scious in the parking lot with severe head injuries."'162 Pitzner had used a
ladder to get on top of the roof, but when he was found the ladder was
missing. -A screwdriver with a burnt tip was found near Pitzner in the
parking lot, but there were no burns on Pitzner or other indications of
contact with electricity,' 1 6 3 Pitzner's injuries were so severe that a guard-
ian had to bring the action, and he had no recollection of what occurred.
155. Id. at 701.
156. Murk v. Scheele, 120 S.W.3d 865 (Tex. 2003).
157. Id. at 866.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 867.
160. Id.
161. Marathon Corp. v. Pitzner, 106 S.W.3d 724 (Tex. 2003).




Pitzner sued Marathon on a premises liability claim because of evi-
dence that "the premises did not comply with Dallas city building and
mechanical codes in certain respects." He cited two violations in particu-
lar as the cause of his fall:
First, air conditioning units were required to have a thirty-inch work
space in front if their access panels. The access panels of the two
units on Marathon's premises faced one another and were ten to
twelve inches shy of the code requirements. The spacing from elec-
trical components inside the access panel was also less than the
thirty-six inches required by the Dallas Electrical Code.
Second, the air conditioning units did not have a power disconnect
on the roof so that all electrical power to the units could be shut off
by someone working on the roof. The power disconnect to the units
themselves was located downstairs, inside the building and the main
power to the building was located on the ground outside of the
building.1 64
There was a great deal of evidence from both sides related to the theory
that Pitzner received an electrical shock and as a result was thrust back-
wards and fell from the roof.
The supreme court's ruling turned on the sufficiency of evidence to
support the trial court's ruling that the alleged premises defects were the
proximate cause of Pitzner's injuries. According to the court "the com-
ponents of proximate cause are cause in fact and foreseeability."' 6 5 And
"[t]he test for cause in fact, or 'but for causation,' is whether the act or
omission was a substantial factor in causing the injury 'without which the
harm would not have occurred." 66 The crucial factor that the supreme
court relied upon in its decision was that "a finding of cause in fact may
be based on either direct or circumstantial evidence, but cannot be sup-
ported by mere conjecture, guess, or speculation.' '167
After giving a cursory citation to the standard of review for sustaining a
no evidence point of error, it is clear that the real concern of the supreme
court in this matter was that a finding of causation could only be based on
"suspicions" in this case. According to the supreme court, the only evi-
dence that supported the existence of causation was expert testimony that
"pile[d] speculation on speculation and inference on inference."' 168 It
pointed to evidence that suggested other scenarios such as foul play or
fatigue caused by the ninety-five degree heat that day. It noted that in
order to find causation, it would be necessary to infer that several actions
were taken by Pitzner that could not be confirmed by the evidence.
Based upon these factors the supreme court ruled that "there [was] no
evidence that the condition of Marathon's premises proximately caused
164. Id. at 728.
165. Id. at 727.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 729.
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Pitzner's injuries. 1 69
The supreme court appears to concede that circumstantial evidence can
support a finding of a fact. Circumstantial evidence by its nature requires
a jury to "speculate" and make "inferences" in order to reach a conclu-
sion. However, the supreme court notes that in this case there is only
"slight circumstantial evidence. ' 170 and that therefore "something else
must be found in the record to corroborate the probability of the fact's
existence or non-existence."'17 1 Absent from the supreme court's ruling is
a standard for evaluating what constitutes more than "slight circumstan-
tial evidence." It would seem that this judgment would be best left to the
fact finder to apply the weight of the evidence in each individual case.
IV. DAMAGES
In Golden Eagle Archery, Inc., v. Jackson, 72 Ronald Jackson was given
a compound hunting bow manufactured by Golden Eagle Archery, Inc.
("GEA") as a present. While attempting to demonstrate the bow to his
wife, the bow "went out of control"1 73 and a metal rod "struck Jackson in
the eye,"1 74 causing rapid blood loss that required a visit to the emer-
gency room. In addition to loss of vision, Jackson "suffered broken bones
around the orbit of his eye ... a ruptured sinus, and a broken nose."'1 75
Mr. Jackson was also unable to work for two months and had "some per-
manent impairment to his eye and vision, and some disfigurement. '176 At
trial, a damage question was put to the jury that contained the following
six categories for damages with the corresponding amounts awarded by
the jury:
1) Medical Care $25,393.10
2) Physical pain and mental anguish $ 2,500.00
3) Physical impairment of loss of vision $ 2,500.00
4) Physical impairment other than loss of vision $ 0
5) Disfigurement $ 1,500.00
6) Loss of earnings in the past $ 4,600.00177
The appellate court remanded the case to the trial court, holding that an
award of zero damages for "'physical impairment other than the loss of
vision' was against the great weight and preponderance of the
evidence."178
169. Id. at 726.
170. Id. at 729.
171. Id.
172. Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757 (Tex. 2003).




177. Id. at 762.
178. Id. at 761.
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On review the Texas Supreme Court examined whether or not the
court of appeals was correct in finding that a zero damages award for the
forth category was against the great weight and preponderance of the
evidence. Justice Owen's opinion noted that the jury was instructed not
to include damages for one category in another category and that no defi-
nition was given for "physical impairment." In the supreme court's judg-
ment, a review of factual sufficiency in this circumstance has to take into
account that the jury might have awarded damages for that evidence in
another category that overlapped.
The supreme court went through a lengthy analysis aimed at resolving
the three following issues:
1) "what evidence relates to physical impairment,"
2) "the potential for double recovery," and
3) "how a factual sufficiency review should be conducted.1 79
In its analysis the supreme court comprehensively studied the precedent
regarding the meaning of "physical impairment." It noted that most ap-
pellate courts agree that in order to recover for physical impairment "the
injury must be permanent and affect physical activities. ' 180 The supreme
court further pointed out that there was greater controversy about
whether "physical impairment" encompasses hedonic damages.1 81 The
supreme court defined hedonic damages as "loss of enjoyment of life' 1 82
and ruminated as to whether this category was covered by the term
"physical impairment," and more importantly, whether or not it was
compensable.
The standard applied by the court of appeals was "to recover damages
for physical impairment, a plaintiff must prove 'that the effect of his phys-
ical impairment extends beyond any impediment to his earning capacity
and beyond any pain and suffering to the extent that it produces a sepa-
rate and distinct loss that is substantial and for which he should be com-
pensated."' 183 Upon citing several disparate rulings on the issue the
supreme court ruled that the definition of "physical impairment" applied
by the appeals court, one it conceded was prevalent, was improper. Ac-
cording to the supreme court, "that definition does not fully eliminate the
overlap among physical impairment, pain, suffering, mental anguish, and
disfigurement. 1 184 More important to the supreme court was that the jury
was not given this definition. Accordingly, the supreme court found that
the jury could have awarded Jackson for loss of enjoyment of life "as part
of physical pain and mental anguish, or disfigurement, or divided com-
179. Id. at 764-65.
180. Id. at 765 (citing numerous cases).
181. Id. at 766.
182. Id.
183. Jackson v. Golden Eagle Archery, Inc., 29 S.W.3d 925, 928 (Tex. App.-Beau-
mont, 2000), judgm't rev'd, 116 S.W.3d 757 (Tex. 2003) (citing Blankenship v. Mirick, 984
S.W.2d 771, 777 (Tex. App.-Waco 1999, pet. denied).
184. Golden Eagle Archery, Inc., 116 S.W.3d at 769.
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pensation in some manner between the two categories." 185
The supreme court then attempted to craft a standard of review for
appellate courts when a jury has multiple blanks to fill and is instructed
not to overlap damages between categories. Under this standard the
court of appeals is to consider whether the jury might have awarded dam-
ages for a particular category in one of the other categories and must
presume that the jury did not award damages twice for overlapping ele-
ments. In applying the standard to the facts of the case, it was argued
that the court of appeals should have only considered evidence that was
relevant to Jackson's physical impairments other than loss of vision. The
supreme court asserted that the evidence regarding Jackson's broken
bones, ruptured sinus, and headaches could have been applied in the cat-
egory of physical pain and mental anguish or not been compensated at
all. Regarding evidence of loss of enjoyment of life due to Jackson's two
month stay in a hospital, the supreme court conceded that this evidence
best fit within the category of "physical impairment," however, the su-
preme court noted that the jury was not given a definition for physical
impairment and therefore could have compensated Jackson for loss of
enjoyment of life in another category. While apparently conceding that a
jury can be instructed to include loss of enjoyment of life in the definition
of "physical impairment," Justice Owen goes on to state that "the effect
of any physical impairment must be substantial and extend beyond any
pain, suffering, mental anguish, lost wages or diminished earning capacity
and that a claimant should not be compensated more than once for the
same elements of loss or injury."'186
In the end Justice Owen gave a synapses of the methodology the su-
preme court expects the court of appeals to follow in these circumstances
that must be fully quoted so that all can marvel at the absolute dearth of
meaningful guidance:
The court of appeals should conduct a review of each of these cate-
gories, considering the evidence unique to each category. If, after
considering evidence unique to a category, the court concludes that
the jury's failure to award larger damages for that category is against
the great weight and preponderance of the evidence, it should then
consider all the overlapping evidence, together with the evidence
unique to each other category to determine if the total amount
awarded in the overlapping categories is factually sufficient. This
takes into account all the evidence regarding damages in categories
that overlap, but does not credit that evidence more than once in
evaluating the amount awarded by the jury.187
In applying this nonsensical "standard" to the facts of the case, the su-
preme court determined evidently that all of the evidence could be ac-
counted for by the damages awarded in five of the six categories and
185. Id. at 770.
186. Id. at 772.
187. Id. at 773.
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there was none left over for the sixth category. Justice Owen acted as
juror, not as justice.
Justice O'Neill filed a concurring opinion, along with Justice Schneider
that began with the editorial comment: "If I were directed to conduct a
factual sufficiency review of the evidence in this case under the standard
the court articulates today, I wouldn't have a clue." 188 According to Jus-
tice O'Neill the case should be determined according to the standard ar-
ticulated in Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 189 holding that the court of appeals
should
[D]etail the evidence relevant to the issue in consideration and
clearly state why the jury's finding is factually insufficient or is so
against the great weight and preponderance as to be manifestly un-
just; why it shocks the conscience; or clearly demonstrates bias. Fur-
ther, those courts, in their opinions, should state in what regard the
contrary evidence greatly outweighs the evidence in support of the
verdict. 190
According to Justice O'Neill, the appeals court failed to apply this stan-
dard. She faulted the court of appeals for "examining the record for evi-
dence against the jury's finding" 191 and "failing to recite all of the
evidence that supports the jury's finding. '192 Additionally, the justice as-
serted that "in order to recover, Jackson had to demonstrate that his
physical impairment other than the loss of vision produced a distinct loss
that was substantial and should be compensated."' 193 According to Justice
O'Neill, in order to remand, the appeals court would have to identify the
evidence that applied to the category in question, state why it did not
overlap with the other categories, and then apply the Pool analysis. 194
V. CONCLUSION
The increasing trend for Tort law in Texas is to construct statutory
guidelines in an ad hoc manner, reacting to short term economic pres-
sures. Typically, this approach has not come as the result of an in-depth
analysis of systemic problems, but a reaction to inflammatory rhetoric
and divisive politics. What is apparent is that Texans are no longer being
trusted to evaluate the merits of each individual case, with all of the rele-
vant subtleties that typically exist. Instead, a generic framework is being
superimposed according to the pressures of lobbyists and their client's
needs.
188. Id. at 776 (O'Neill & Schneider, J. concurring).
189. Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1986).
190. Golden Eagle Archery, Inc., 116 S.W.3d at 776 (citing Pool, 715 S.W.2d at 635).
191. Id. at 777.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
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